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of jurisdiction, but the Appellate :Division, First Department, unanimously reversed on the law, specifically finding that defendant Barrett's
participation in the alleged libel terminated with her performance in
Los Angeles. Since defendant Barrett had no contact with New York
regarding the alleged libel, the court concluded that there was no
86
jurisdictional basis.

Clearly, the determinative fact in Streslin was the complete control exercised by co-defendant Metromedia concerning distribution of
the tapes of defendant Barrett's performances. Indeed, this element
distinguishes a similar case, Totero v. World Telegram Corp.,3 7 where
jurisdiction under 302(a)(1) was sustained. In Totero, a nondomiciliary
defendant had mailed articles, in accordance with his contract, directly
from Spain to United Features Syndicate, Inc. in New York. Thereafter,
United Features, under contract with its members, distributed defendant's articles. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging he had no contract with the syndicate member in New York which published the
libel, and therefore, was not subject to the jurisdiction of New York
courts. The Supreme Court, New York County, rejected this assertion,
holding that defendant's activity of sending articles into New York
and the distribution of them by United Features pursuant to a contract
with the defendant, constituted a "transaction of business."3' 8
This decision implicitly concludes then, that the third-party intervention did not prevent the defendant from actively participating in
the distribution process. In this light the denial of long-arm jurisdiction in Streslin seems justifiable, since the defendant therein was not
involved in the tape distribution.
CPLR 302(a)(2): Careful distinction between contract and tort actions
espoused.
StanatManufacturingCo,v. Imperial Metal FinishingCo.8 9 was an
action against a foreign corporation which neither did business under
CPLR 301 nor transacted business under CPLR 302(a)(1). A dispute
had arisen from the breach of a sales contract. In order to obtain in
personam jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(2), which concerns commission of torts within New York by nondomiciliaries, plaintiff alleged
a6Id., 320 N.Y.S.2d at 886, citing Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Lasker-Goldman Corp., 26
N.Y.2d 280, 258 N.E.2d 20, 309 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1970). See also The Quarterly Survey, 45
ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 342, 345-48 (1970).
87 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963), discussed in The
Biannual Survey, 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 406, 410 (1964).
8 Id. at 597, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
89 325 F. Supp. 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (Weinstein, J.).
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that defendant never intended to fulfill the contract arid "in effect,
committed a fraud by inducing shipment on the basis of a promise
40
never intended to be kept."
The federal district court, in rejecting this contention, stressed the
careful distinction drawn between tort and contract actions in CPLR
302.41 It concluded that the consequences of permitting characterization
of a contract case as a tort action necessitates that the statutory distinction be judicially enforced. Otherwise,
a plaintiff could, merely by alleging that a contracting party never
intended to fulfill his promise, create a tortious action in fraud,
[and] there would be no effective way of preventing almost every
contract case from being converted to a tort for jurisdictional purposes.42
The plain intent of CPLR 802 supports the court's rejection of
plaintiff's interpretation of the statute.4 3 Moreover, a contrary decision
would extend New York's long-arm jurisdiction drastically, thereby
violating established judicial policy to refrain from assuming a legislative role."
CPLR 308(2): Construction of "dwelling place."
CPLR 308(2)45 prescribes that, except in matrimonial actions,
personal service upon a natural person may be effected without prior
attempt to personally deliver the summons to the named defendant,
"by delivering the summons within the state46 to a person of suitable
age and discretion47 at the actual place of business, dwelling place4 8 or
40 Id.

at 795.

41 Compare CPLR 302(a)(2)8:(3) with CPLR 302(a)(l)&(4).
42

325 F. Supp. at 796, citing Old Westbury Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Mitchell, 44

Misc. 2d 687, 689, 254 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964), aff'd, 24 App. Div.

2d 636, 262 N.Y.S.2d 438 (2d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 670, 219 N.E.2d 868, 273
N.YS.2d 418 (1966).
43 Cf. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co., v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d
428 (2d Cir. 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv, 147, 155 (1971).
44 See Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24,
cert, denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN's L. Rs v.

122, 134-38 (1965).
45 Chapter 852 of the Laws of 1970 repealed the former CPLR 308 and replaced it
with a new § 308, effective September 1, 1970.
46 "Where there is a basis of jurisdiction so that service may be made outside New
York under CPLR 313 or 314, 'the state' should be construed to refer to the state where
the summons is being served." 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 308, supp. commentary at 196
(1970).
47 See Bradian v. Chavez, 159 N.Y.L.J. 79, Apr. 23, 1968, at 16, col. 6 (delivery to the
thirteen-year-old son of the defendant was held to be valid). See also 7B McKsNEY'S CPLR
308, supp. commentary at 197 (1970): "[IThe statute should be satisfied if the summons is
left with a person who has enough sense to know what it is."
48" 'Dwelling house' means a house in which a person dwells, lives or abides

